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Abstract
We study the max k-cut game on an undirected and unweighted graph in
order to find out whether an optimal solution is also a strong equilibrium. While
we do fail to show that, by proving an alternate formula for computing the cut
value difference for a strong deviation, we show that optimal solutions are 7-
stable equilibria.
Furthermore, we prove some properties of minimal subsets with respect to a
strong deviation, showing that each of their nodes will deviate towards the color
of one of their neighbors and that those subsets induce connected subgraphs.
1 Introduction
In many contexts, a group of individuals might have to choose, among different
options, one that is not chosen by the other individuals or, in some cases, by the
least amount of other individuals. This is the classic anti-coordination game, and
some players will end up with a lower profit if there are more choices than players.
Generally though an individual might only care about the choice of a smaller number
of other individuals (rather than all of them), possibly differently about each of them
and not necessarily been reciprocated; this problem can be modelled via graphs, by
attributing to each link the interest of an individual for another.
Examples of this extension include: radio towers communicating via radio signals
when only few frequencies are available, companies deciding which type of product to
produce, employees learning different skills, miners deciding which area they should
drill for resources, airplanes selecting flight paths, . . .
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This anti-coordination game on a graph can also be seen as an extension to game
theory of the max k-cut problem, i.e. the problem of partitioning the nodes of a
graph in k subsets in such a way that minimizes the sum of the weights of the links
between nodes belonging to the same subset. This problem has been extensively
studied because of its many applications, and finding an optimal solution for it is a
known NP-complete problem [19]; modern approaches involve turning the problem
into a semi-definite program and either using constraint relaxations alongside search
algorithms (cut-and-branch, branch-and-bound, . . . ) to obtain an exact solution or
using an approximation algorithm (es. [24], [25]) or a heuristic-based one (es. [21],
[22]) in order to find a good enough solution, trading accuracy for computational time
(see [23] for a quick excursus on the subject and [20] for a more thorough exploration).
In a sense, the max k-cut game asks whether players can achieve a social optimum
by themselves (or, equivalently, maximize the cut value by themselves), rather than
being forced one upon by an external regulator, or whether an optimal solution found
via a search algorithm can be overturned by a joint deviation of some of the nodes,
considered as autonomous agents.
It has been proved that this approach fails if the underlying graph is directed or
weighted: strategy profiles that maximize the cut value on an undirected weighted
graph are not able to withstand “sabotage" by more than 3 players [3], while the same
type of strategy profiles on directed graphs might not be a pure Nash equilibrium at
all [8].
It is currently unknown whether optimal strategy profiles for undirected un-
weighted graphs are strong equilibria or not.
Related work Bramoullé [9] worked on an anti-coordination game on an undi-
rected unweighted graph with two strategies and a more generalized payoff, where he
proved that mixed Nash equilibria minimize frustration, that minimizing frustration
is NP-hard and some properties on some particular types of graphs. In his doctorate
dissertion, Höfer studied many types of games on graphs, among which the max k-cut
game and he showed that the price of stability of this game is 1 (and, thus, this game
always has a pure Nash equilibrium), that finding an optimal Nash equilibrium is
computationally hard and that the price of anarchy of this game has a lower bound
in k−1k .
This direction has been further pushed by Gourvès and Monnot in their articles [3]
and [4], where they proved that, for undirected weighted graphs, optimal colorings are
3-stable equilibria but not necessarily 4-stable equilibria, that every Nash equilibrium
is a 1k−1 -approximate strong equilibrium, and that the strong price of anarchy of this
game is 2k−22k−1 , and by Kun, Powers and Reyzin [8], that proved that the bound found
by Höfer was tight, that a (not necessarily optimal) Nash equilibrium could be found
in polynomial time and that determining whether a max k-cut game on a directed
graph had a Nash equilibrium was NP-hard.
Carosi, Fioravanti, Gualà and Monaco [1] showed that, on undirected unweighted
graphs, optimal colorings are 5-stable equilibria and 1-local-strong equilibria (i.e.
resistant to deviations by complete subgraphs), that the cut value is not a strong
potential function and that, if the graph has some particular properties, an optimal
coloring is a strong equilibrium (as it has been defined as in [15] and in [16]).
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Smorodinski and Smorodinski [11] extended this game to hypergraphs, by exam-
ining two possible extensions of the payoff function: the first one rewards a node N
based on how many hyperedges N is incident to that contain some nodes that are
differently colored with respect to N , the other one rewards N based on how many
hyperedges N is incident to that contain only nodes that are differently colored with
respect to N . They compute the price of anarchy for games with the first payoff
on r-minimal hypergraphs and bounds for games with the other payoff on r-uniform
hypergraphs.
Looking beyond the topic of max k-cut games, these games are related to the
coordination games studied by Apt, Simon et alia [12] [13] [14]. In this type of game,
a node receives a payoff equal to the number of its neighbors that share its color.
In the first one [12], they showed that, for undirected unweighted graphs, under
list colorings, Nash equilibria and 2-stable equilibria always exist but j-stable equi-
libria might not (for j ≥ 3), that some type of graphs for which strong equilibria
always exist and the co-NP complexity of determining whether a strategy profile is
a j-stable equilibrium.
In the second one [13], they proved that, for directed unweighted graphs, de-
termining whether Nash equilibria exist is NP-complete and some cases a strong
equilibrium always exists and can be found in linear time. In the third one [14], they
study many different kinds of directed weighted and unweighted graphs, determining,
for each kind, bounds on the improvement paths and c-improvement paths and the
complexities of finding a Nash equilibrium and a strong equilibrium.
Höfer and Suri [7] studied the dynamics of network interaction games (which are
a generalization of the max 2-cut game) and showed that, when each node makes its
move one after another (sequential game), the 2-type interaction game will always
converge to a pure Nash equilibrium after at most (|V | + 1)(|E| + 1)2 steps, and
that, when all the nodes make their moves at the same time (concurrent game) and
adhere to an “inertia"-based approach for convergence, the local interaction game
will converge to a Nash equilibrium in expected polynomial time; furthermore, they
compare converging times of sequential and concurrent games for the subcases of the
coordination game and the max 2-cut game.
Lastly, we want to mention Kearns’ graph coloring games from [17] and [18],
which have a payoff function that is similar to the max k-cut’s, except that a node
receives a payoff of 0 if it shares its color with one of its neighbors.
Our results In this article we will prove some properties of minimal subsets with
respect to a strong deviation and that optimal colorings are 7-stable equilibria by
exploiting an alternative way to formulate the cut value increase.
More specifically, this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we state some
definitions and some results from [1] that we are going to use in the later sections.
Then, in Section 3, we will prove a couple of properties of minimal subsets with
respect to a strong deviation and an alternative formula for computing the cut value
increase due to a deviation, along with an extension to undirected weighted graphs.
In Section 4, by exploiting the formula and (implicitly) the properties, we will prove
that optimal colorings are 7-stable equilibria. Lastly, Section 5 deals with issues
stemming from the approach used to prove the results in Section 4 and mentions
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possible work-arounds and future developments.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions
An anti-coordination game is a tuple 〈V, K, {fp}p∈V 〉, where V is the player set,
which we represent as V = {1, . . . , n(∈ N)}, K is the strategy set, the same for each
player and represented as K = {1, . . . , k(∈ N)}, and a family of payoff functions (one
for each player) defined as follows: fp : Kn → N, c 7→
∣∣{q ∈ V : q 6= p and cq 6= cp}∣∣,
that is, for each player p, the number of other players who don’t have the same color
as p.
Let G = 〈V,E〉, with E ⊆ {s ∈ P(V ) : |s| = 2}, be a undirected and unweighted
graph with n = |V | nodes and e = |E| links:
Definition 1. We define the max k-cut game G on the graph G by extending the
anti-coordination game as follows:
• the set V as the player set;
• K again as the strategy set for all players, from which we define a strategy
profile or coloring as a vector β ∈ Kn containing the strategies chosen by each
node (or, alternatively, a function that maps each node v to its color βv);
• for each v ∈ V , the payoff function µv : Kn → N, β 7→
∣∣{u ∈ V : {u, v} ∈
E, βu 6= βv}
∣∣.
Let C ⊆ V and σ, γ ∈ Kn: we say that C deviates from the coloring σ towards
the coloring γ if, for any node d ∈ C, γd 6= σd and, for any node b /∈ C, γb = σb;
furthermore, we say that C strongly deviates from σ towards γ if C deviates from
σ to γ and, for any d ∈ C, µd(γ) > µd(σ) and that C is minimal with respect to
strongly deviating from σ towards some other coloring η ∈ Kn if C strongly deviates
from σ to η and, for any D ( C, for any coloring ι ∈ Kn, D does not strongly deviate
from σ to ι.
Let β ∈ Kn we define a cut of a graph G as a set E(G, β) := {{i, j} ∈ E :
βi 6= βj}. We define the cut value for a coloring β over a graph G as S(G, β) :=
|E(G, β)| and an optimal coloring as a coloring that maximizes the cut value on
G (or, equivalently, G). We define the cut difference between two colorings α and
β on a graph G as ∆S(G,α, β) := S(G,α) − S(G, β). If C ⊆ V deviates from σ
towards γ, we say that the set of links E(G, σ)\E(G, γ) leaves the cut and that the
set E(G, γ)\E(G, σ) enters the cut. We will not mention G whenever it is clear that
we are working on G.
For q ∈ [1, n] ⊂ N, we define a q-stable equilibrium as a coloring σ such that, for
any C ⊆ V , if |C| ≤ q, then, for each coloring γ ∈ Kn\{σ}, C does not strongly
deviate from σ towards γ. For q = 1, we have the Nash equilibrium (which we will
denote by NE) for G and, for q = n, we have a special equilibrium which we call
strong equilibrium.
For α, β ∈ Kn and C ⊆ V , we define:
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• P (α, β) :=
∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : αi = αj , βi 6= βj}∣∣;
• Pint(C,α, β) :=
∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : i, j ∈ C, αi = αj , βi 6= βj}∣∣;
• Pbound(C,α, β) :=
∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : i ∈ C, j ∈ V \C, αi = αj , βi 6= βj}∣∣;
• Pext(C,α, β) :=
∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : i, j ∈ V \C, αi = αj , βi 6= βj}∣∣.
By definition, P (α, β) = |E(β)\E(α)| and, for each C ⊆ V , P (α, β) = Pint(C,α, β)+
Pbound(C,α, β) +Pext(C,α, β). Also, like with G, we will not mention C whenever it
is clear that we are working on C.
For v ∈ V , we define the degree of the node v as δv :=
∣∣{j ∈ V : {v, j} ∈ E}∣∣
and, for β ∈ Kn and a ∈ K, the degree of v in β with respect to the color a as
δav (σ) :=
∣∣{j ∈ V : {v, j} ∈ E, σj = a}∣∣. For C ⊆ V , we define KC(σ) := {c ∈ K :
∃v ∈ C such that σv = c} and, for i = 1, . . . , n, Ci(σ) = {v ∈ C : σv = c}.
For C ⊆ V , we call G(C) the subgraph induced by C and, for H subgraph of
G = 〈V,E〉, we say that V (H) is the node set of H. Also, we define the neighborhood
of the subset C as N(C) := {u ∈ V \C : ∃d ∈ C such that {u, d} ∈ E}. We will call
Kp the complete graph with p nodes. Lastly, we say that H is a connected component
of the graph G if H is a connected subgraph of G and, for each node i ∈ V (H), for
each node j /∈ V (H), {i, j} /∈ E.
2.2 Some previous result
Proposition 1 (Prop. 1a from [1]). Let σ be a NE for G and let C ⊆ V be a minimal
subset w.r.t strongly deviating from σ to another coloring γ; then KC(σ) = KC(γ).
This one is a very strong result that says that no color can be added or removed
from the pool of colors used by a deviating minimal subset, and we will use this
proposition alongside the pigeon-hole principle to obtain some of the later results.
Lemma 1 (Prop. 3 from [1]). Let σ be a NE for G and let C ⊆ V be a minimal
subset w.r.t strongly deviating from σ (to another coloring γ); then, if |KC(σ)| ∈
{2, |C| − 1, |C|}, ∆S(σ, γ) > 0.
Theorem 1 (Thm. 4 from [1]). Any optimal coloring for a max k-cut game on an
unweighted, undirected graph is a pure 5-stable equilibrium.
This was the previous largest stability result and its improvement is the main topic
of this article. Also, because of this result, we can focus on pure equilibria and ignore
mixed equilibria, since 5-stability implies x-stability (x < 5); most importantly, a
pure 5-stable equilibrium is also a pure Nash equilibrium and we will use this fact in
order to prove some results.
Conjecture 1. Any optimal coloring for a max k-cut game on an unweighted, undi-
rected graph is a strong equilibrium.
This conjecture also would mean that any solution of the max k-cut problem (on
the same type of graph) can’t be “overthrown" by any number of nodes that don’t
achieve a profit equal to their degree.
Lastly, we are going to mention a result that gives an “upper bound" to a theorem
we will prove in the next section.
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Proposition 2 (Prop. 7 from [1]). The cut value is not a strong potential function
for the max k-cut game, eve if only minimal subsets are allowed to deviate.
3 Results
The following propositions deal with a couple of intuitively obvious properties of
max k-cut games on graphs whose proof is deceptively complex. Both properties
seem unrelated with the main result, but they help reducing the number of possible
“configurations" of deviating minimal subsets, that is, they force certain subgraphs
and colorings onto deviating minimal subsets in a way that can’t be replicated with
non-minimal subsets.
The first proposition shows that minimal deviations induce a “color rearrange-
ment" inside the minimal subset, which is especially useful when the number of
colors used by that subset is almost as large as the number of nodes in that subset.
Proposition 3. Let σ be a NE for G and let C ⊆ V be a minimal subset w.r.t strongly
deviating from σ (to another coloring γ); then, for each node d ∈ C, there is a node
b ∈ C such that b 6= d, {b, d} ∈ E and γd = σb.
Proof. The statement says that each node of C deviates towards the color of one of
its neighbors in C. As such, the proof will be split into two halves: “each node in C
deviates towards the color in σ of one of its neighbors" and “that/those neighbor/s
must be in C".
The first statement can be written as: for each node u ∈ C, δγuu (σ) > 0. Let then
t ∈ C be such that δγtt (σ) = 0; then either δσtt (σ) = 0 or δσtt (σ) > 0:
• δσtt (σ) = 0: in this case t does not need to improve its payoff as it is already
earning its maximum payoff; this contradicts the hypothesis that C is minimal
with respect to strongly deviating from σ.
• δσtt (σ) > 0: since δ
γt
t (σ) = 0, we have that {u} is minimal with respect to
strongly deviating from σ, which contradicts the hypothesis that σ is a NE and
that C is minimal with respect to strongly deviating from σ.
Therefore, for each node u ∈ C, δγuu (σ) > 0. On a sidenote, this holds even if t
deviates towards the color of another node in C that is not adjacent to t.
As for the other half, let h ∈ C such that γh = σy, for some y ∈ V \C, and that,
for each node b ∈ C such that {b, y} ∈ E, σb 6= σy. It is possible that in γ some
neighbors of h might have deviated towards σy, that is, δ
σy
h (γ) ≥ 0. Since C strongly
deviates, we have that µh(γ) > µh(σ), that is, δ
σy
h (γ) < δ
σh
h (σ).
Now, none of the neighbors of h have deviated from σy, which means that δ
σy
h (γ) ≥
δ
σy
h (σ). Furthermore, since σ is a NE, we have that δ
σy
h (σ) ≥ δσhh (σ).
By putting everything together, we have:
δ
σy
h (σ) ≥ δσhh (σ) > δσyh (γ) ≥ δσyh (σ) ≥ 0,
which is impossible.
By uniting the two results, we have that, for each node d ∈ C, there is a node
b ∈ C such that b 6= d, {b, d} ∈ E and γd = σb. 
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The following proposition allows us not to consider non-connected subgraphs in
Section 4.
Proposition 4. Let σ be a NE for G and let C ⊆ V be a minimal subset with
respect to strongly deviating from σ (to another coloring γ); then, G(C) is a connected
subgraph of G.
Proof. Suppose that G(C) is not connected and, without loss of generalization, that
is split into two connected components H and J ; let H be such that |KV (H)(σ)| = 1:
if V (H) = {h}, for some h ∈ C, then, for each node m ∈ V such that {m,h} ∈ E,
σm = γm, and thus, for each node c ∈ K, δch(σ) = δch(γ).
If argmin
a∈K
δah(σ) = σh, then h does not actually need to deviate from σ, since its
payoff would not increase, which means that C\(V (H)) is minimal with respect to
strongly deviating from σ; if argmin
a∈K
δah(σ) 6= σh, then {h} is minimal with respect to
strongly deviating from σ. In both cases we contradict the hypotheses.
Suppose now that |V (H)| > 1: each node should choose the same color in γ
(Prop. 1), yet the previous proposition states that each node deviates towards the
color chosen in σ by one of their neighbors in C (Prop. 3). As H is a connected
component of G(C), the only color those nodes could deviate towards is their own,
which results in a contradiction.
This means that |KV (H)(σ)| > 1.
Suppose now that |KV (H)(σ)| > 1 and |KV (J)(σ)| > 1. The previous proposition
states that, for each node d ∈ V (H), there is a node b ∈ C such that b 6= d, {b, d} ∈ E
and γd = σb, and the same holds for V (J).
Since H and J are connected components of G(H), there is no link connecting
any of the nodes of V (H) to any of the nodes of V (J); thus, the statement of
the previous proposition becomes: for each node d ∈ V (H)(V (J)), there is a node
b ∈ V (H)(V (J)) such that b 6= d, {b, d} ∈ E and γd = σb.
This means that both V (H) and V (J) could deviate from σ by themselves, that
is, C is not minimal with respect to strongly deviating from σ and both V (H) and
V (J) are.
This argument can be easily extended to any number of connected components.
Thus, G(C) must be a connected subgraph of G. 
3.1 A formula
The properties of this game leaves one wondering what could happen when a densely
connected subgraph were to strongly deviate. It is not hard to imagine that the cut
value might not increase because of that (compare with Prop. 2). An example of this
is the following lemma, which shows what happens when we discard the assumption
of Lemma 1 from [1] that σ is a NE and we extend it to subcliques:
Lemma 2. Let σ be a coloring for G and let C ⊆ V such that Ki ⊆ C for some
i ≤ n and such that C strongly deviates from σ to γ; then, for T := Ki ∩ C,
and Q := {{p, q} ∈ E : p ∈ T, q ∈ N(T )}, if |T | ≤ 2, ∣∣(E(T, γ)\E(T, σ))∣∣ +∣∣(E(Q, γ)\E(Q, σ))∣∣ > 0.
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Proof. Suppose thatM = |T | nodes (m1, . . . ,mM ) deviate alongside C, that µmj (γ)−
µmj (σ) = 1, for j = 1, . . . ,M , that each of those M nodes deviates towards a differ-
ent color and that, thus, all the links between nodes of T and nodes of Ki\C; then,
for each of those M nodes, since i − 1 links enter the cut, i − 2 links leave the cut.
The total number of links between nodes of T and nodes of Ki\C that enter the cut
are exactly:
i(i− 1)
2
−(i−M)(i−M − 1)
2
=
=
1
2
(i2 − i− i2+iM + iM −M2 + i−M) =
=
M
2
(2i−M − 1).
Considering that, in total, M(i − 2) links exit the cut, we have that those M
nodes contribute at least the following number of links to the cut:
M
2
(2i−M − 1)−M(i− 2) =
= iM − M
2
2
− M
2
− iM + 2M =
=
M
2
(3−M),
which is > 0 if M ≤ 2. 
While this lemma is not useful by itself, it offers some insight on how deviating
densely connected subsets of nodes might affect the cut value difference.
As a sidenote, if we assume that C is minimal with respect to the deviation from
σ, then the same result holds if M ≤ 4: this is due to the additional nodes and links
required to guarantee the minimality of C. If we consider a subset composed only
of those 2M nodes, we have that, for M ≥ 5, the cut value does not increase; in
particular, for M = 6, we get Prop. 2.
The reasoning behind the results of this section can be generalized to arbitrary
subsets and arbitrary couples of colorings.
Theorem 2. Let G be as before, let σ, γ ∈ Kn and let C ⊆ V ; then
∆S(σ, γ) =
∑
d∈C
(µd(γ)− µd(σ)) + Pint(γ, σ)− Pint(σ, γ) + Pext(σ, γ)− Pext(γ, σ).
Proof. Without loss of generalization, let KC(σ) = {1, . . . , s}, KC(γ) = {1, . . . , g},
for each color i = 1, . . . , l, oi i-colored nodes ∈ C in σ and, for each of those oi nodes
which we will call ni,j (j = 1, . . . , oi):
• vi,j i-colored nodes in C in σ that are adjacent to it and such that bi,j of them
are not γni,j -colored in γ (in the following, γi,j := γni,j );
• ui,j i-colored nodes in V \C in σ (and in γ) that are adjacent to it;
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• zi,j γi,j-colored nodes in C in γ that are adjacent to it and such that fi,j of
them are not i-colored in σ;
• ti,j γi,j-colored nodes in V \C in γ (and in σ) that are adjacent to it.
By definition, for i = 1, . . . , l e j = 1, . . . , oi, vi,j−bi,j = zi,j−fi,j : both the quantities
vi,j − bi,j and zi,j − fi,j enumerate the number of neighbors of ni,j in C that are both
i-colored in σ and γi,j-colored in γ.
From this, we have that, for µi,j(γ) := µni,j (γ):
µi,j(γ) =µi,j(σ) + vi,j + ui,j − zi,j − ti,j =
=µi,j(σ) + bi,j + ui,j − fi,j − ti,j .
Since
l∑
i=1
oi = |C| and:
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
(µi,j(γ)− µi,j(σ)) =
∑
d∈C
(µd(γ)− µd(σ)), we have
that: ∑
d∈C
(µd(γ)− µd(σ)) =
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
(bi,j + ui,j − fi,j − ti,j).
Now, by construction, we have that Pbound(σ, γ) =
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
ui,j and that Pint(σ, γ) =
1
2
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
bi,j , since each of the bi,j nodes, and, equivalently, links, is counted twice.
From this, it follows that ∆S(σ, γ) = P (σ, γ)− P (γ, σ):
∆S(σ, γ) = S(γ)− S(σ) = ∣∣E(γ)∣∣− ∣∣E(σ)∣∣ =
=
∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : γi 6= γj}∣∣− ∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : σi 6= σj}∣∣ =
=
(∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : γi 6= γj and σi = σj}∣∣+ ∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : γi 6= γj and σi 6= σj}∣∣)−
−∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : σi 6= σj}∣∣ =
=
∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : γi 6= γj and σi = σj}∣∣− ∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : σi 6= σj}∣∣+
+
(∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : σi 6= σj}∣∣− ∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : σi 6= σj and γi = γj}∣∣) =
=
∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : γi 6= γj and σi = σj}∣∣− ∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : σi 6= σj and γi = γj}∣∣ =
= |E(γ)\E(σ)| − |E(σ)\E(γ)| = P (σ, γ)− P (γ, σ).
Putting everything together:
∆S(σ, γ) = P (σ, γ)− P (γ, σ) =
= Pint(σ, γ) + Pbound(σ, γ) + Pext(σ, γ)− Pint(γ, σ)− Pbound(γ, σ)− Pext(γ, σ) =
=
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
(
1
2
bi,j + ui,j − 1
2
fi,j − ti,j) + Pext(σ, γ)− Pext(γ, σ) =
=
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
((bi,j + ui,j − fi,j − ti,j) + 1
2
(fi,j − bi,j)) + Pext(σ, γ)− Pext(γ, σ) =
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=
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
(bi,j + ui,j − fi,j − ti,j) +
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
1
2
(fi,j − bi,j) + Pext(σ, γ)− Pext(γ, σ) =
=
∑
d∈C
(µd(γ)− µd(σ)) +
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
1
2
fi,j −
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
1
2
bi,j + Pext(σ, γ)− Pext(γ, σ) =
=
∑
d∈C
(µd(γ)− µd(σ)) + Pint(γ, σ)− Pint(σ, γ) + Pext(σ, γ)− Pext(γ, σ).

While the general theorem is too broad to be useful, it can be further refined into
a couple of useful corollaries:
Corollary 1. Let G be as before, let σ, γ ∈ Kn and let C ⊆ V deviate from σ to γ;
then
∆S(σ, γ) =
∑
d∈C
(µd(γ)− µd(σ)) + Pint(γ, σ)− Pint(σ, γ).
Proof. As C deviates from σ to γ, none of the nodes in V \C change color, which
means that Pext(σ, γ) = Pext(γ, σ). 
Corollary 2. Let G be as before, let σ be a NE for G and let C ⊆ V strongly deviate
from σ to γ ∈ Kn; then
∆S(σ, γ) ≥ |C| − Pint(σ, γ).
Proof. As C strongly deviates from σ to γ, we have that, for each node d ∈ C,
µd(γ) ≥ µd(σ) + 1, thus,
∑
d∈C
(µd(γ)− µd(σ)) ≥
∑
d∈C
1 = |C|.
Thus, we have:
∆S(σ, γ) ≥ |C|+ Pint(γ, σ)− Pint(σ, γ) ≥ |C| − Pint(σ, γ).

Intuitively, this corollary says that, in order to check whether the cut value always
increases after some deviation without knowledge of N(C), we need to check the
worst-case scenario, the one in which each node of C improves its payoff by the least
possible margin (i.e. by 1) and as much as possible of that profit is due to color
clustering in G under σ.
Interestingly, Corollary 1 can be extended to max k-cut games on undirected
weighted graphs:
Corollary 3. Let Gˆ be a max k-cut on a weighted undirected graph, let σ, γ ∈ Kn
and let C ⊆ V deviate from σ to γ; then
∆Sˆ(σ, γ) =
∑
d∈C
(µˆd(γ)− µˆd(σ)) + Pˆint(γ, σ)− Pˆint(σ, γ).
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Before going through the proof, we need to extend the max k-cut game to undi-
rected weighted graphs:
• the game will be denoted as Gˆ on a undirected weighted graph Gˆ = 〈V,E,w〉,
where w : E → R is a weight function over Gˆ;
• both player sets and strategy sets are the same as in the base case;
• the payoff function is slightly different: µˆv(σ) :=
∑
p∈V :
{p,v}∈E,σp 6=σv
w({p, v});
• Sˆ(α) :=
∑
{p,q}∈E:
αp 6=αq
w({p, q}) and Pˆ (α, β) :=
∑
{p,q}∈E:
αp=αq andβp 6=βq
w({p, q}).
Pˆint, Pˆbound and Pˆext are defined similarly to Pˆ . Also, Sˆ(σ) =
∑
e∈E(α)
w(e) and Pˆ (α, β) =∑
e∈E(β)\E(α)
w(e).
Proof (of Corollary 3). We will extend Thm. 2 first and then prove this corollary.
Like in Thm. 2, for each color i = 1, . . . , l, for j = 1, . . . , oi, we define for each
node ni,j ∈ C ⊆ V the following quantities:
bˆi,j :=
∑
p∈C: {p,ni,j}∈E,
σp=i and γp 6=γi,j
w({p, ni,j}), uˆi,j :=
∑
q∈V \C:
{q,ni,j}∈E, σq=i
w({q, ni,j}),
fˆi,j :=
∑
p∈C: {p,ni,j}∈E,
σp 6=i and γp=γi,j
w({p, ni,j}), tˆi,j :=
∑
q∈V \C:
{q,ni,j}∈E, γq=γi,j
w({q, ni,j}).
Again, we have that µˆi, j(γ) = µˆi, j(σ) + bˆi,j + uˆi,j − fˆi,j − tˆi,j and:
∑
d∈C
(µˆd(γ)− µˆd(σ)) =
l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
(bˆi,j + uˆi,j − fˆi,j − tˆi,j).
Also, showing that ∆Sˆ(σ, γ) = Pˆ (σ, γ)− Pˆ (γ, σ) and that
∆Sˆ(σ, γ) =
∑
d∈C
(µˆd(γ)− µˆd(σ)) + Pˆint(γ, σ)− Pˆint(σ, γ)− Pˆext(γ, σ) + Pˆext(σ, γ)
is similar to Thm.2, except that we split the sums with respect to the subsets rather
than splitting the subsets themselves
(
i.e., instead of S(γ) =
∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : γi 6=
γj e σi = σj}
∣∣ + ∣∣{{i, j} ∈ E : γi 6= γj e σi 6= σj}∣∣, we have Sˆ(γ) = ∑
{p,q}∈E:
γp 6=γq
w({p, q}) −
∑
{p,q}∈E:
γp 6=γq , σp=σq
w({p, q})).
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Like in Corollary 1, if we assume that C deviates from σ to γ, we have that
Pˆext(σ, γ) = Pˆext(γ, σ) = 0 and that
∆S(σ, γ) =
∑
d∈C
(µd(γ)− µd(σ)) + Pˆint(γ, σ)− Pˆint(σ, γ).

Extending Corollary 2 to undirected weighted graphs is possible, but the resulting
lower bound is also dependant on the weight function associated with G.
Lastly, Thm. 2 can also be extended to directed graphs, but it would not offer
much information. We shall only examine the directed unweighted graph, as the
directed weighted graph follows from this and from the undirected weighted graph.
Let G¯ = 〈V,A〉, µ¯d(α) :=
∣∣{(p, d) ∈ A : αp 6= αd}∣∣, where A ⊆ V 2\{(x, x) : x ∈
V }, S¯(α) := ∣∣{(p, q) ∈ A : αp 6= αq}∣∣ and P¯ (α, β) := ∣∣{(p, q) ∈ A : αp = αq, βp 6=
βq}
∣∣; similarly to the undirected unweighted case, we have that S¯(γ) − S¯(σ) =∑
d∈C
(µ¯d(γ) − µ¯d(σ)). For directed unweighted graphs, P¯int(C, σ, γ) =
∣∣{(p, q) ∈ A :
p, q ∈ C, σp = σq, γp 6= γq
∣∣ = l∑
i=1
oi∑
j=1
b¯i,j , where, for each node ni,j (i = 1, . . . , l, j =
1, . . . , oi), b¯i,j is the number of nodes having an outgoing arc towards ni,j that are
i-colored in σ and are not γi,j-colored in γ; this means that, unlike links in the undi-
rected cases, arcs are not counted twice and, thus, that we cannot use this extension
like in the undirected cases.
Lastly, Prop. 2 implies that the left side of the inequality from Corollary 2 can
be non-positive, which strongly limits Corollary 2’s usefulness outside this article.
Furthermore, even if the left side were positive, we will show in Section 5 some cases
where the right side is non-positive.
4 Stable equilibria
Before proving the main result of this article, we are going to extend Prop. 1 to
minimal subsets C such that |KC(σ)| ∈ {|C| − 3, |C| − 2}. In order to do so, we are
going to apply the lower bound from Corollary 2 to each possible graph configuration
that stems from a minimal subset C using more than |C|−4 colors, improving Lemma
1.
Theorem 3. Let σ be a NE for G and let C ⊆ V be a minimal subset w.r.t strongly
deviating from σ to another coloring γ; if |KC(σ)| ≥ |C| − 3, then ∆S(σ, γ) > 0.
Proof. The idea is to find the smallest C with respect to a fixed value of PI :=
Pint(σ, γ), both for |KC(σ)| = |C| − 2 and for |KC(σ)| = |C| − 3.
In both cases, because of Prop. 1 and the pigeon-hole principle, there are only
a few subcases, which allows us to prove each subcase individually. In short those
subcases are:
• |KC(σ)| = |C| − 2:
12
– |Cc(σ)| = 3, |Cai(σ)| = 1 (for i = 1, . . . , |C| − 3), PI ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
– |Cd(σ)| = |Ce(σ)| = 2, |Cai(σ)| = 1 (for i = 1, . . . , |C|−4), PI ∈ {0, 1, 2}
• |KC(σ)| = |C| − 3:
– |Cc(σ)| = 4, |Cai(σ)| = 1 (for i = 1, . . . , |C| − 4), PI ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
– |Cd(σ)| = 3, |Ce(σ)| = 2, |Cai(σ)| = 1 (for i = 1, . . . , |C| − 5), PI ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
– |Cf (σ)| = |Cg(σ)| = |Ch(σ)| = 2, |Cai(σ)| = 1 (for i = 1, . . . , |C| − 4),
PI ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
Also, because of Prop. 3 and Prop. 4, we can assume that C induces a connected
subgraph in which each node deviates towards the color of one of its neighbor: this
further narrows down the possible configurations of KC(σ) and KC(γ).
Let |KC(σ)| = |C| − 2: then either there exists exactly one color c ∈ K such that
|Cc(σ)| = 3 or there are two colors a, b ∈ K such that a 6= b and |Ca(σ)| = |Cb(σ)| = 2.
When there exists exactly one color c ∈ K such that |Cc(σ)| = 3, we have that
PI ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}:
• PI = 3: let a ∈ K be such that |Ca(σ)| = 3; then, for each node d ∈ Ca(σ),
there is at least another node rd ∈ C such that {d, rd} ∈ E, rd /∈ Ca(σ),
σrd = γd and, for each node e ∈ Ca(σ), if d 6= e, then rd 6= re.
The least amount of nodes in C is 6, when each node in Ca(γ) has exactly one
neighbor as above, those three neighbors are colored a in γ and those 6 nodes
are the only ones in C. Therefore ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ |C| − 3 ≥ 6− 3 = 3.
• PI = 2: let a ∈ K be such that |Ca(σ)| = 3; then there exists exactly one node
m ∈ Ca(σ) such that δm(G(C)) = 2. As in the previous subcase, there is at
least a neighbor for each a-colored node that is colored the color the respective
a-colored node deviates to in γ.
Unlike the previous case, the a-colored nodes that are not m can deviate to the
same color in γ (as they are not adjacent) and even have a common neighbor
with those properties. Therefore ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ |C| − 2 ≥ 5− 2 = 3.
• PI = 1: by reasoning in a similar way as in the previous subcase, it is not hard
to show that ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ |C| − 1 ≥ 5− 1 = 4.
• PI = 0: in this subcase, each a-colored node could deviate towards the color of
a single common neighbor, which deviates towards a; therefore, the minimum
number of nodes in C is 4 and ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 4.
When there are two colors a, b ∈ K such that a 6= b and |Ca(σ)| = |Cb(σ)| = 2,
we have that PI ∈ {0, 1, 2}:
• PI = 2: let a, b ∈ K be such that |Ca(σ)| = |Cb(σ)| = 2; then, for each node
d ∈ Ca(σ)∪Cb(σ), there is at least another node rd ∈ C such that {d, rd} ∈ E,
σrd 6= σd, σrd = γd and, for each node f ∈ Ca(σ) ∪ Cb(σ), if σf = σd, then
rd 6= rf .
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Let Ca(σ) = {x, y} and Cb(σ) = {z, w}; by reasoning in a similar way as in
“|Ca(σ)| = 3, PI = 2", we can reduce the minimum number of nodes in C by as-
suming without loss of generality that σy = γw and that σw = γy. As for x and
z, if {x, z} /∈ E, then it is possible that γx = γz(= σt, for some t suchthatσt 6=
a, b), otherwise there are at least 2 nodes neither a- nor b-colored on C.
This means that |C| ≥ 5, from which: ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 5− 2 = 3.
• PI = 1: by reasoning in a similar way to the previous subcase, it follows that
∆S(σ, γ) ≥ |C| − 1 ≥ 5− 1 = 4.
• PI = 0: the smallest C is the one where a-colored nodes deviate towards b
and b-colored nodes deviate towards a, which means that |C| ≥ 4. Therefore,
∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 4.
Let C be such that |KC(σ)| = |C| − 3 and, given σ, let us define the following
notations:
• σ : {(t, u1, . . . , u|C|−4), (4, 1, . . . , 1)} when σ is such that there is a color
a ∈ KC(σ) such that |Ca(σ)| = 4 and, for each other color bo ∈ KC(σ) (o =
1, . . . , |C| − 4), |Cbo(β)| = 1;
• σ : {(t1, t2, u1, . . . , u|C|−5), (3, 2, 1, . . . , 1)} when σ is such that there are two
colors a1, a2 ∈ KC(σ) such that |Ca1(σ)| = 3, |Ca2(σ)| = 2, a1 6= a2 and, for
each bo ∈ KC(σ)\{a1, a2} (o = 1, . . . , |C| − 5), |Cbo(σ)| = 1;
• σ : {(t1, t2, t3, u1, . . . , u|C|−6), (2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1)} when σ is such that there
are three colors a1, a2, a3 ∈ KC(σ) such that for i = 1, 2, 3, |Cai(σ)| = 2, for
j 6= i, ai 6= aj and, for each bo ∈ KC(σ)\{a1, a2, a3} (o = 1, . . . , |C| − 4),
|Cbo(σ)| = 1.
Now, we examine thoroughly each of the cases, with respect to the possible values
of PI:
• σ : {(t, u1, . . . , u|C|−4), (4, 1, . . . , 1)}: in this case PI ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 6}. Let
s ∈ K be such that |Cs(σ)| = 4:
– PI = 6: each node in Cs(σ) will deviate towards a color that has not been
chosen by the other nodes in Cs(σ). By reasoning in a similar way as in
“|KC(σ)| = |C|−2", this means that the nodes of C are at least the nodes
in Cs(σ) and the (at least) four nodes representing the colors chosen by
the nodes in Cs(σ). Therefore, |C| ≥ 8 and ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 8− 6 = 2.
– PI = 5: there are two cases:
∗ |KCs(σ)(γ)| = 4: like in the previous subcase, ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 8− 5 = 3;
∗ |KCs(σ)(γ)| = 3: this means that the two nodes in G(Cs(σ)) that
are not adjacent deviated towards the same color; like in “|KC(σ)| =
|C|−2, 1st case, PI = 2", it implies that |C| ≥ 7 and that ∆S(σ, γ) ≥
7− 5 = 2;
– PI = 4: in this case, |KCs(σ)(γ)| ∈ {2, 3, 4}:
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∗ |KCs(σ)(γ)| = 4: we get ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 8− 4 = 4;
∗ |KCs(σ)(γ)| = 3: we get ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 7− 4 = 3;
∗ |KCs(σ)(γ)| = 2: this one depends on whether K3 is a subgraph of
G(Cs(σ)) or not. If it is, this subcase is similar to the previous
subcase, which means that the minimum size of C is 7 and that
∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 7− 4 = 3.
Otherwise, then the couples of nodes in G(Cs(σ)) that are not adja-
cent might choose the same color, making it so that the minimum size
of C is 6 (from which: ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 6− 4 = 2).
– PI < 4: with the exception of PI = 0, where each node in Cs(σ) might
deviate towards the same color, this case is similar to the ones we have
mentioned before, which means that in this case ∆S(σ, γ) > 0;
• σ : {(t1, t2, u1, . . . , u|C|−5), (3, 2, 1, . . . , 1)}: in this case PI ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4}.
Let a, b ∈ K be such that |Ca(σ)| = 3 and |Cb(σ)| = 2: this means that, by
construction, |C| ≥ 5 and that, without delving further, ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ |C|−PI ≥
5− 4 = 1.
In this case, we shall examine each case anyway, as the lower bound is actually
higher than 1:
– PI = 4: the smallest C is obtained when an a-colored node and a b-
colored node deviate towards b and a respectively, another a-colored node
and the other b-colored node deviate towards a third color, say, c, the
third a-colored node deviates towards a fourth color, say, d, the c-colored
node and the d-colored node deviate towards a and those 7 nodes are the
only nodes in C. Therefore, ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 7− 4 = 3;
– PI = 3: like in the subcase “σ : {(t, u1, . . . , u|C|−4), (4, 1, . . . , 1)}, PI =
5", either G(Ca(σ)) ∼ K3 e G(Ca(σ))  K3:
∗ G(Ca(σ)) ∼ K3: in this case, each node in Ca(σ) deviates towards
a different color. This means that, even taking into account that
b-colored node might deviate towards the same color, the minimum
value of |KC(σ)|, that is the least number of colors in C, is 4, like in
“σ : a31 · a22 · b11 · · · · · b1|C|−5, PI = 4".
This means that the least number of nodes in C is 7, from which:
∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 7− 3 = 4;
∗ G(Ca(σ))  K3: like in “σ : {(t, u1, . . . , u|C|−4), (4, 1, . . . , 1)}, PI =
5", the non-adjacent nodes in Ca(σ) might deviate towards the same
color. If that happened, by reasoning in a similar way as in “σ :
{(t1, t2, u1, . . . , u|C|−5), (3, 2, 1, . . . , 1)}, PI = 4", the least number
of colors in C becomes 3, which means that |C| ≥ 6. From this, it
follows that: ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 6− 3 = 3;
– PI < 3: like in “σ : {(t, u1, . . . , u|C|−4), (4, 1, . . . , 1)}, PI < 4", there is
no further need to study this case, as in each case ∆S(σ, γ) > 0;
• σ : {(t1, t2, t3, u1, . . . , u|C|−6), (2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1)}: in this case PI ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Let a, b, c ∈ K be such that |Ca(σ)| = |Cb(σ)| = |Cc(σ)| = 2 and a 6= b 6= c 6= a:
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by construction |KC(σ)| ≥ 3 and |C| ≥ 6, which means that, without examining
each subcase, ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 6− 3 = 3.
Unlike in “σ : {(t1, t2, u1, . . . , u|C|−5), (3, 2, 1, . . . , 1)}", it suffices to check
the “PI = 3" case to show that 3 is the highest upper bound: let PI = 3; since
|KC(σ)| ≥ 3, each couple of nodes of, say, a might deviate towards respectively
b and c (and so would both the b-colored nodes and the c-colored nodes). This
implies that |C| ≥ 6 and that ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 6− 3 = 3.
Therefore, for |KC(σ)| ≥ |C| − 3, S(γ) > S(σ). 
Now, we prove the first half of the main result of this article: the idea is to use
Thm. 4 to prove that, for almost all the cases where a minimal subset C has at
most 7 nodes, the cut value almost increases, and then to prove separately that the
same holds for the subcase “|C| = 7, |KC(σ)| = 3"; this allows to say that optimal
colorings are resilient to deviations of minimal subsets with at most 7 nodes.
Theorem 4. Let σ be a NE for G and let C ⊆ V be a minimal subset w.r.t strongly
deviating from σ to another coloring γ; if |C| ≤ 7, then ∆S(σ, γ) > 0.
Proof. Because of the previous theorem, this result holds for |C| ≤ 6 and for |C| = 7
such that |KC(σ)| ∈ {0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7}. This leaves the case where |C| = 7 and
|KC(σ)| = |C| − 4 = 3.
The core idea is to repeat what we have done with |KC(σ)| ≥ |C| − 3, except we
want to prove that, for |C| = 7, the maximum values of PI are < 7.
Let C ⊆ V be such that |KC(σ)| = 3 and, without loss of generalization, assume
that KC(σ) = {1, 2, 3}. Like in Thm. 3, because of Prop. 1 and the pigeon-hole
principle, when |C| = 7 and |KC(σ)| = 3, there are only a few subcases:
• σ : {(1, 2, 3), (3, 2, 2)} when σ is such that |C1(σ)| = 3 and |C2(σ)| =
|C3(σ)| = 2;
• σ : {(1, 2, 3), (3, 3, 1)} when σ is such that |C1(σ)| = |C2(σ)| = 3 and
|C3(σ)| = 1;
• σ : {(1, 2, 3), (4, 2, 1)} when σ is such that |C1(σ)| = 4, |C2(σ)| = 2 and
|C3(σ)| = 1;
• σ : {(1, 2, 3), (5, 1, 1)} when σ is such that |C1(σ)| = 5 and |C2(σ)| =
|C3(σ)| = 1.
Now, we examine each possible “configuration" of σ:
• σ : {(1, 2, 3), (3, 2, 2)}, σ : {(1, 2, 3), (3, 3, 1)}: in these cases, the largest
values of PI are, respectively, 5 and 6, thus ∆S(σ, γ) > 0;
• σ : {(1, 2, 3), (4, 2, 1)}: in this case, maxPI = 7, which is the subcase where
G(C1(σ)) ∼ K4 and, again with abuse of notation, C2(σ) ∈ E. This implies
that each of the 1-colored node deviates towards a different color, represented
each by a different node; this cannot happen because |C| = 7 and |KC(σ)| = 3,
while PI = 7 requires both |C| ≥ 9 and |KC(σ)| ≥ 5. Thus, ∆S(σ, γ) > 0.
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As a small sidenote, PI ≤ 5. Suppose that PI = 6: then either G(C1(σ)) ∼ K4
or G(C1(σ))  K4:
– G(C1(σ)) ∼ K4: this one is similar to PI = 7, except that the 2-colored
nodes might deviate towards the same color in γ. Therefore, we contradict
|C| = 7, like in PI = 7;
– G(C1(σ))  K4: this case offers a different problem: by reasoning in a
similar way as in PI = 7, we have that the 1-colored nodes now only need
other three colors rather than four, but this contradicts |KC(σ)| = 3.
Thus, PI ≤ 5 e ∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 7−max{PI} = 7− 5 = 2;
• σ : {(1, 2, 3), (5, 1, 1)}: while, if we were to work like in the previous theorem,
we would get a more thorough proof, we just need to realize that, like in the
previous case, the nodes of C1(σ) are only allowed to choose between 2 and 3
when deviating. This means that |KG(C1(σ))(γ)| ≤ 2, that is G(C1(σ)) must be
either a bipartite graph or a graph without links.
As such, we have that maxPI = 6, when G(C1(σ)) ∼ K3,2, the complete
bipartite graph with 3 nodes in a part and 2 in the other. This means that
∆S(σ, γ) ≥ 7− 6 = 1.
Therefore, we have that, in each subcase, ∆S(σ, γ) > 0, that is, S(γ) > S(σ). 
In order to prove that optimal colorings are 7-stable equilibria, we need to prove
that the statement of Thm. 4 holds for non-minimal subsets as well:
Theorem 5. Let σ be an optimal coloring for G; then σ is also a 7-stable equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose first that σ is a 5-stable equilibium and let C ⊆ V be such that
|C| = 6 and C is not minimal with respect to strongly deviating from σ (towards
some coloring γ); we want to show that this leads to a contradiction.
We have already shown that, if F ⊆ V is minimal with respect to strongly
deviating from σ (towards some coloring η) and |F | ≤ 7, then S(η) > S(σ). Since C
is not minimal with respect to strongly deviating from σ, there is a subset D ⊂ C
such that D is minimal with respect to strongly deviating from σ (towards some other
coloring ι). Since we assumed that σ is an optimal coloring and since D is minimal
with respect to strongly deviating from σ (towards ι) and |D| < 6, this leads to a
contradiction because S(ι) > S(σ) = max
α∈Kn
S(α).
Therefore, optimal colorings are also 6-stable equilibria.
By repeating the same reasoning with |C| = 7 and with σ as a 6-stable equilib-
rium, we have that the same holds and, from this, that optimal colorings are 7-stable
equilibria. 
In a similar way, we can extend Thm. 3 to non minimal subsets:
Corollary 4. Let σ be an optimal coloring for G played on the graph G; then, for
each C ⊆ V , if |KC(σ)| ≥ |C| − 3, then, for each coloring ι, C does not strongly
deviate towards ι.
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Proof. Because of Thm. 3, we already know that in a max k-cut game H on a graph
H, if D ⊆ V (H) is minimal with respect to strongly deviating from a NE α towards
some coloring β, then S(α) < S(β).
Suppose now that C ⊆ V (G) strongly deviates from an optimal coloring σ towards
some coloring γ, that |KC(σ)| ≥ |C| − 3, and that C is not minimal with respect to
doing so. Then there is a subset F ⊂ C such that F itself is minimal with respect to
strongly deviating from σ. Since F ⊂ C and, thus, for any a ∈ K, Fa(σ) ⊆ Ca(σ),
we have that |D| − 3 ≤ |KD(σ)| ≤ |D|, which contradicts Thm. 3.
Therefore, if any subset C of V (G) were to strongly deviate from σ, then it must
be that |KC(σ)| < |C| − 3. 
As a last note, since in Thm. 5 we only use the fact that any optimal coloring
is resistant to strong deviation done by minimal subsets of at most 6 nodes, the
same result also holds for non-minimal subsets (with respect to a strong deviation)
containing at most 8 nodes: indeed, a non-minimal subset of 8 nodes that deviates
from an optimal coloring would have to have a minimal subset deviating from the
same coloring and containing at most 7 nodes, which we know it’s impossible.
As we shall see in the next section, proving the same for a minimal subset con-
taining at most 8 nodes will require a different approach.
5 Remarks
Issues with Thm. 4 Because of how we have stated Thm. 4 (and, likewise,
Thm. 3), its statement is equivalent to saying that strong deviations from a r-stable
equilibria (r ≤ 7) always induce an increase of the cut value and an eventual extension
to strong equilibria would imply Conj. 1.
Unfortunately, the way Corollary 2 works gets around having to understand yet
unknown properties of optimal colorings and it has already been proven that S(G, ·)
is not a strong potential function (Prop. 2); this means that the lower bound in
Corollary 2 can be non-positive. This means that it is not true that strong deviations
from strong equilibria always induce an increase of the cut value. In the following,
we will show a couple of subgraphs that contain a deviating subset that does not
induce a cut increase.
Remark: throughout this section, we will denote in purple the edges that enter
the cut after a deviation, in orange the edges that leave the cut after a deviation
and in black the edges that neither enter the cut nor enter the cut after a deviation;
furthermore, we will denote in light blue the deviating nodes, in light green the non-
deviating nodes whose profit increases after a deviation and in red the non-deviating
nodes whose profit decreases after a deviation. Lastly, each of the black edges shown
in the following graphs guarantees the minimality of the deviating subgraphs and
that each node deviates as shown in the pictures.
18
1→ 2
1→ 3
1→ 4 1→ 5
1→ 6
2→ 1
3→ 1
4→ 1
5→ 1
6→ 1
Fig. 1: prototype subgraph for ∆S(σ, γ) = 0.
Note that |KC(σ)| = 6 = |C| − 4.
In the graph above, by applying the formula from Corollary 2, we have that
the lower bound is exactly 0, i.e. the cut value might not increase after the strong
deviation of this subset. An actual example of this happening is the following:
c1→4
b1→3 d1→5
e1→6a1→2
1
f2→1
g3→1
h4→1
i5→1
2
3 4
5
j6→1
6
3
3
3
3 4 4 4 4
2
2 2 2 6 6
6
6
5
5
55
Fig. 2: subgraph that includes a deviating subset such that ∆S(σ, γ) = 0.
The graph in the previous page is similar to the one used in the proof of Prop.
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2: like in that proof, we assume that each nondeviating node has no need to deviate
and that each deviating node has enough neighbors of the colors towards which does
not deviate that it could only deviate towards the color it is deviating towards. Also,
this example disproves an extension of Thm. 3 to |KC(σ)| = |C| − 4 (for σ NE).
1→ 3
1→ 3
1→ 3 1→ 2
1→ 2
1→ 2
3→ 1 2→ 1
Fig. 3: prototype subgraph for ∆S(σ, γ) < 0.
In this case, by applying the formula from Corollary 2, we have that the lower
bound is -1, which means that, depending on the graph and on the starting coloring
σ, the cut value might actually decrease after the strong deviation of the subset.
a1→3
b1→3
c1→3 d1→2
e1→2
f1→2
1
g3→1 h2→1
3 2
3
3
3 2
2
2
Fig. 4: subgraph that includes a deviating subset such that ∆S(σ, γ) < 0.
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For this subgraph, we make the same assumptions as for the graph in Fig. 2. This
example disproves that a NE is a 8-stable equilibrium when only minimal subsets are
allowed to deviate.
Future developments Both examples show that, in order to prove Conj. 1, it is
necessary to find out more about the properties of optimal colorings. For example,
one could study how the neighborhood of a deviating subset is colored in an optimal
coloring or how clustered colors are in an optimal coloring; another approach would
be to study the graph induced by nodes whose utility is lower than its degree.
Alternatively, one could try to exploit defective colorings [26]: a (k,m) defective
coloring (or (k,m)-coloring) for a graph G is a coloring of G with k colors such that
each node has at most m neighbors of the same color as itself. We conjecture that
any optimal coloring that is a (k,1)-coloring (respectively, (k,2)-coloring) for a (k,1)-
colorable graph that is not k-chromatic (respectively, for a (k,2)-colorable graph that
is not (k,1)-colorable) is a strong equilibrium. If it were so, it would also imply that
Conj. 1 is true for both planar graphs and toroidal graphs [27].
Also, one could try to find a strong potential function for the class of max k-
cut game on undirected unweighted graphs: Gourvès and Monnot proved that this
game on undirected weighted graphs does not have a strong potential function and
Corollary 2 only confirms that the cut value is not a strong potential function (being
an extension of Prop. 2), not that max k-cut games on undirected unweighted graphs
do not have one at all.
It is known that, for undirected weighted graphs, an optimal coloring is not
necessarily a 4-stable equilibrium [3] and, for directed graphs, an optimal coloring
might not be a Nash equilibrium at all [8]; a possible development would be to find a
characterization of 4-stable equilibria for the former and a characterization of Nash
equilibria for the latter.
Lastly, one could study how stable an optimal coloring is in other games similar
to the max k-cut game, like the generalized graph k-coloring games [2] or or the ones
from [10] and [5].
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